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mitigationolcanic eruptions are infrequent and experience in emergency planning and
mitigation for such events remains limited. The need for urgently developing more robust methods for
risk assessment and decision making in volcanic crises has become increasingly apparent as world
populations continue to expand in areas of active explosive volcanism. Nowhere is this more challenging
than at Vesuvius, Italy, with hundreds of thousands of people living on the flanks of one of the most
dangerous volcanoes in the world. We describe how a new paradigm, evidence-based volcanology, has
been applied in EXPLORIS to contribute to crisis planning and management for when the volcano enters
its next state of unrest, as well as in long-term land-use planning. The analytical approach we adopted
enumerates and quantifies all the processes and effects of the eruptive hazards of the volcano known to
influence risk, a scientific challenge that combines field data on the vulnerability of the built
environment and humans in past volcanic disasters with theoretical research on the state of the
volcano, and including evidence from the field on previous eruptions as well as numerical simulation
modelling of eruptive processes. Formal probabilistic reasoning under uncertainty and a decision analysis
approach have provided the basis for the development of an event tree for a future range of eruption
types with probability paths and hypothetical casualty outcomes for risk assessment. The most likely
future eruption scenarios for emergency planning were derived from the event tree and elaborated upon
from the geological and historical record. Modelling the impacts in these scenarios and quantifying the
consequences for the circumvesuvian area provide realistic assessments for disaster planning and for
showing the potential risk–benefit of mitigation measures, the main one being timely evacuation, but
include for consideration protecting buildings against dilute, low dynamic pressure surges, and
temporary roof supports in the most vulnerable buildings, as well as hardening infrastructure and
lifelines. This innovative work suggests that risk-based methods could have an important role in crisis
management at cities on volcanoes and small volcanic islands.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
EXPLORIS has developed methods for quantifying the risk in
future explosive eruptions of Vesuvius to provide improved support
for decision making in a future crisis, and some of their potential
applications for emergency planning and mitigation will be
described. In the wording of historians of science, this has been
possible by adopting an evidence-science paradigm, a shift in
thinking involving the novel application of formal probabilistic
reasoning and statistical decision analysis which we refer to as evi-r).
l rights reserved.dence-based volcanology1. The need to find a robust approach to the
mitigation of volcanic disasters is driven by the rapid increases of
human populations in areas of active volcanism, especially at cities
on volcanoes and on small islands. Although our main focus in this
paper is Vesuvius, the methods were also found to be applicable for
volcanic emergency management at the three island study volcanoes
in EXPLORIS: Teide (Tenerife), Sete Cidades (San Miguel, Azores), and
La Soufrière (Guadeloupe).1 A paradigm is an entire scientific outlook — a constellation of shared assumptions,
beliefs and values that unite a scientific community and allow normal science to take
place. The word is often used in the context of Thomas Kuhn's book The structure of
scientific revolutions (1963), the most influential work of the philosophy of science in
the last 50 years (Okasha, 2002).
Fig. 1.Hazardmap at the eruption of Mount St Helens, 1980 (left). The actual area of devastation caused by the main surge (right) was much larger than envisaged (Miller et al., 1981).
Most people caught in the surge were killed (58 people), with survivors only at the periphery of the run-out (Baxter, 1990).
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is a young science and the work of the relatively small number of
scientists engaged on active volcanoes is slowly becoming more
widely known through recent well publicised eruptions and
volcanic crises (Scarpa and Tilling, 1996; Thompson, 2000).2 The
specific onset, style and duration of an eruption cannot be precisely
determined by a volcano's precursory activity and so the accurate
prediction of the outcome of a state of unrest at an explosive volcano,
such as Vesuvius, is rarely possible. Nevertheless, valuable constraints
can be placed upon the outcome if the past behaviour and eruptive
history of the volcano is known, even if not well understood, for
developing eruption scenarios and hazard maps that depict the areas
of likely impact by eruptive phenomena around the volcano.
A precautionary approach to an impending eruption at an explosive
volcanowill defer tohazardmapping todefine the “worst-case”hazard
scenario. On working in this domain of low probability — high
consequence incidents and uncertainty, Rosi (1996) advises: “when
reliable evaluations are lacking, volcanic risk assessment must be
necessarily conservative and consider events of large magnitude, even
if their probability of occurrence is remote (our italics).” Rosi refers to2 Emergency planning and mitigation at explosive volcanoes is relatively new: major
eruptions are too infrequent for scientists or emergency planners to build up a large
individual experience and expertise. Almost invariably, every major eruption is a steep
learning curve for those involved — scant reassurance to the public at risk. One leading
volcanologist, Haroun Tazieff (1913–1998), was notable for providing a “flying doctor”
service and offering his own personal experience by going from eruption to eruption.
The main urgent need in a crisis is to set up modern volcano monitoring equipment in
the hands of scientists experienced in interpreting the findings. The US Geological
Survey (USGS) has a group available to do this to assist developing countries — VDAP
(Volcano Disaster Assistance Program). At the next crisis of Vesuvius, scientists and
equipment from EU countries will be involved in this task to assist their Italian
colleagues. An overview of conventional volcanic crises management is well described
by de la Cruz-Reyna et al. (2000) and in related papers in the Encyclopedia of
Volcanoes.such events as the largest expected eruption. Almost by definition,
however, volcanic emergency management using this hazard-based
approachwill bewithout the benefit of rigorous decision-support tools
and limited to a single eruption which dominates the risk scenario,
leaving fewoptions for emergencyplanners other than a precautionary
evacuation if the activity during a renewed state of unrest becomes
threatening.
2. Hazard and risk management at notable past eruptions
Surprisingly few advances in the understanding of the impacts
of explosive volcanism, and the role of scientists in forecasting
eruptions and devising mitigation measures, were made until the
eruption of Mount St Helens in 1980. A study of the hazards of
Mount St Helens, the most active volcano in the conterminous
United States, had been completed by Crandell and Mullineaux
(1978) only a short time before its renewal of activity with a
magnitude 4.1 earthquake on March 20, 1980. The scientists of the
US Geological Survey used the study to define the hazard zones to
protect the public and forestry workers by limiting access to the
wilderness area around the volcano (Miller et al., 1981). The Mount
St Helens hazard-zonation map was issued on April 1 and was
based on what was thought at the time to be the largest area likely
to be impacted by pyroclastic flows and lahars (Fig. 1). This turned
out to be an underestimate of the actual size of the May 18
eruption, with the directed blast covering an area about three times
greater than the apparent extent of the largest such blast of the last
4000 years, and devastating an area 10–15 times larger (Miller et al.,
1981). The size of the north-flank landslide and the lateral blast had
not been forecast by the scientists and the volcano had given no
warning.
At Mount Pinatubo, Philippines, in 1991 a hastily prepared
hazard map, released on May 23, less than one month before the
eruption, was all that was available to scientists due to the paucity of
studies undertaken in the past (Fig. 2). The map incorporated the
Fig. 2. Hazard map at the Mount Pinatubo eruption, 1991 (Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996). The predicted area of devastation by pyroclastic flows and surges (PDCs) was
based on the largest previous event known at the time and corresponded well to the actual event. Later, it became known that an even larger event had occurred at Mount
Pinatubo.
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the distribution of the pyroclastic flows in the climactic eruption
that followed on June 15. But Newhall and Punongbayan (1996)
were to discover later that even bigger eruptions had occurred over
35,000 years ago and if the eruption had been of this order then tens
of thousands of people would have died: “we and they were lucky”.
Nevertheless, thousands owe their lives to the timely evacuation
based on the published hazard map as the volcanic activity drama-
tically escalated.
Hazard-based approaches always have implicit risk assumptions,
despite having the appearance of simplicity and being easily compre-
hensible. At Mount Pinatubo, the risk (uncalculated) was eventually
judged to be elevated over an area as far as 25–30 km from the crater
and from which people were advised to evacuate. A similar cautious
judgement, had it been applied to the volcanic crisis on the small island
of Montserrat, West Indies, would have led to its evacuation in 1997,
when the escalating activity had reached a crisis point: only 17 km long
and 9 kmwide, the whole island appeared to come under threat as the
explosive activity of the Soufrière Hills volcano grew following the
onset of the eruption in July 1995. But recommending evacuation of the
island would have ignored the totality of knowledge that had been
accumulated by scientists since the eruption began and pre-empted
their proposal to undertake a quantification of the risk and to use this to
make a more proportionate response towards the mitigation of the
volcanic hazard.In December 1997, a meeting took place of a team of interna-
tional scientists to undertake a formal, evidence-based analysis
on the Montserrat eruption which included, for the first time in a
volcanic crisis, a risk assessment which was based, not on one
dominant, worst-case eruption, but eleven possible foreseeable
eruption types and estimates of the casualties associated with these,
ranging from the least to the most severe (lateral blast) events. This
evidence-based approach incorporated all that was known about the
volcano, including its geological history, the protective features of
the topography of the island, numerical modelling of the pyroclastic
flow and tephra fallout, and estimates of the vulnerability of the
island's buildings to tephra fallout. An event tree was devised and
conditional probabilities were assigned to its branches, the values
obtained by elicitation using a mathematical technique that
weighted the individual scientist's expert judgements. The method
also incorporated the model and statistical uncertainties involved.
The outputs shown here in the form of a risk map (Fig. 3) show the
zones of societal risk for a hypothetically distributed population of
suffering five or more severe casualties in the following 6 months,
decreasing to the northern part of the island and farthest from
the volcano, where the risk fell to background levels. The map and
supporting data underlay the judgment of the volcanologists that
the whole island did not need to be evacuated as a precaution;
instead, part of the population closest to the volcano at the time
needed to move further north to reduce the most immediate risks.
Fig. 3. Example of a risk map produced during the volcanic crisis in 1997 onMontserrat,West Indies (see Aspinall et al., 2002). The outputs are in the form of area-specific societal risk
(the probability of 5 or more severe casualties in the 6 months following the risk assessment, expressed as a percentage) which is of most use to decision makers, but individual risk
was also considered. Societal risk, unlike individual risk, incorporates the scale aversion factor of multiple fatalities or large numbers of seriously injured arising in a single incident.
The societal risk increases the closer the location of the actual population (in the shaded area) to the crater, the northern part of the island was at a background risk for the Caribbean
(area 1=0.04%), with the risk increasing from area 2 (0.12%) to area 3 (0.32–0.45%) and area 4 (2.5–5%). The last two figures were judged as presenting an unacceptable societal risk.
457P.J. Baxter et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 178 (2008) 454–473This judgement was accepted by the authorities and a full-scale
evacuation was avoided.3
At both Mount St Helens and Mount Pinatubo, the state of unrest
lasted only about two months between the beginning of premoni-
tory signs of renewed activity and the cataclysmic eruptions, a period
long enough for volcanologists to collate their available knowledge
on the past eruptive activity of each volcano and to provide a forecast
of a “worst-case” eruption for hazard zonation and evacuation
planning, whilst being short enough to maintain their credibility
with the authorities and the public (Newhall and Punongbayan,
1996). This is an important point: the hazard-based evacuation
should not be seen as a sensible reaction to the uncertainty and as3 The scientific argument for a wide hazard zone is the inherent unpredictability of
explosive eruptions and the limitations of scientific knowledge. This unpredictability
can be termed chaotic behaviour. Chaotic does not mean random: ordinary chaotic
systems are completely deterministic and computational even if they seem to behave
as though they are not deterministic at all. This is because the accuracy according to
which the initial state of the volcanic system needs to be known for a deterministic
prediction of future behaviour can be totally beyond anything that is conceivably
measurable. Moreover, due to the strongly non-linear nature of their governing
dynamics, small changes in the initial conditions can have large influences on the
eruptive outcome, yet they are beyond our ascertainment. Thus, even if the full
dynamical state of the volcano were known, an eruption is apparently governed by
feed-back mechanisms which control and stabilise its dynamics, so that small and
unpredictable changes in conduit or vent size during the eruption, for example, would
be enough to initiate transitions in the eruptive phenomena. Behaviour that manifests
critical sensitivity to very small changes either in initial conditions, or as a result of
feedback, is present everywhere in nature. But although chaos imposes a fundamental
limit to prediction (this is epistemic uncertainty — see Footnote 9), scientific models
can be robust enough in the best hands to constrain the range of expected eruptive
phenomena and make forecasts when based on data from all available sources,
including the all-important monitoring of activity with modern equipment. See Woo
(1999). A meeting held in London in December 1997 by the Chief Scientist to the UK
government and his advisors concluded that the methodology used by the scientists at
the Soufrière Hills volcano was sound and he based his advice to ministers on the
strength of the scientific risk assessment.a fail-safe measure, because a disgruntled populationwill eventually
force the authorities to allow them to return if no eruption actually
occurs and there is no visible evidence of growing activity, when
they could nevertheless be at the same, or even greater, risk from an
eruption (Simkin et al., 2001)4.
Indeed, at certain other explosive volcanoes, including Popoca-
tepetl, Mexico; Tungurahua and Guagua Pichincha, Ecuador; and
Galeras, Colombia, the state of unrest has not always been followed
by a major eruption, highlighting the uncertainty amongst scientists
in making forecasts. In each of these crises, a precautionary
and lengthy evacuation would have had severe political and socio-
economic consequences, even if such a step would have been
feasible in the face of strong opposition from an unconvinced
populace. On a small island like Montserrat, where the eruptive
activity continued for years, a hazard-based approach could not
eventually be sustained, as people responded to the volcanologists'
uncertainty over worst-case scenarios by refusing to evacuate from
their homes in the absence of demonstrably threatening activity. In
other words, sections of the population had begun to adopt their
own form of risk-based judgement, as indeed some people did when
they returned to the exclusion zone against all scientific and official4 The numbers of people killed in volcanic eruptions over last centuries is
surprisingly small — less than 300, 000 people — despite averaging 2 to 4 fatal
eruptions per year in recent decades. An analysis of the fatalities showed that many
occurred in the first 24 h when the element of surprise was greatest, but nearly two
thirds of deaths and half the fatal events took place over one month after the eruption
started, with fatal events occurring even years after the onset. The message is clear,
that volcanic eruptions can present risks for months or even years after their beginning
and should not be regarded in the same category as floods, hurricanes and
earthquakes. Their onset may be sudden like these other natural disasters, but they
contrast with these in that the danger does not necessarily decline rapidly with time
and may actually increase because of the unpredictability of the eruptive behaviour
and the desire of a willing population to believe that the danger has passed and they
can resume normal living. See Simkin et al., 2001.
458 P.J. Baxter et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 178 (2008) 454–473advice, and with fatal consequences for nineteen people, on June 25,
1997 (Loughlin et al., 2002).
3. Evidence-based volcanology
The risk methodology used on Montserrat in 1997 has since been
called “evidence-based volcanology,” a form of probabilistic reasoning
that resembles evidence-based medicine and which has now become
widely accepted by medical professionals (Aspinall et al., 2003). The
methodology is used in diagnosis and decision making in patient
management and treatment, and for deriving guidelines in clinical
practice (Hunink and Glasziou, 2001; Sackett et al., 2000). In evidence-
based sciences all aspects of evidential reasoning are treated by formal
probabilistic procedures. Frequentist results from conventional statis-
tical analyses are incorporated, where they are available, as is uncertain
evidence and the weight accorded to it (degree of belief, subjective
probability). All available theoretical and observational information is
used. The application of probability theory adopts the precepts of
Bayesian statistics. Psychologists have clarified the cognitive processes
involved in clinical reasoning in medicine in the light of two influential
approaches: decisionmaking andproblem solving (Elstein and Schwarz,
2002). Psychological decision research also has applicability in volcanic
risk management because, like medicine, it is influenced by statistical
models of reasoning under uncertainty. The hallmarks of decision
making are that it is open to revision with even partial, or imperfect
information, and it is evidence-based. The use of decision trees (or event
trees, their volcanological equivalent in EXPLORIS) is an important way
of displaying information and formalising judgement.5 The aim is to
arrive at a “rational consensus.” Problem solving, in contrast, is intuitive,
and relies on individuals defining a hypothesis, often by pattern-
recognition or categorisation based on individual past experience, and
then seeking the specific evidence to support it. The danger is that it
becomes closed to data that contradicts the hypothesis; instead of being
evidence-based, it can become “eminence-based” (Taleb, 2007).
The evidence-based strategy in decision making is bottom-up,
open to opinion-revision, sceptical and empirical, whilst problem
solving is more top-down, formulaic and authoritarian.6 The most
instructive example in the history of volcanology of problem solving
and its pitfalls was the public policy fiasco at Guadeloupe in 1976,
when two factions of volcanologists argued over their separate
hypotheses on whether La Soufrière volcano would erupt or not by5 Evidence-based medicine is the most recent and the most successful initiative to
date to apply statistical decision theory in clinical medicine. Decision analysis was
founded on the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). Decisions are laid out
in decision trees, which are tools for an explicit and systematic approach to decision
making based on the premise of rationality (Elwyn et al., 2001). The uptake of decision
trees is limited in routine clinical medicine because of an insurmountable time barrier
to their use (Sackett et al., 2000). Medicine and volcanology differ in one important
respect, namely that the former is data-rich and statistical evidence is relatively easy to
obtain, whilst volcanology is hampered by the rarity of eruptions to study. We do not
think that this detracts from applying decision making to volcanology — to the
contrary, it strengthens the case, as we cannot identify any other way of dealing with
the uncertainty associated with this particular domain of science.
6 The American pragmatist philosopher CS Pierce (1839–1914) is credited with first
questioning the certainty in which science was held and viewing science as “opinion-
revision” In fact, it was a Scot, David Hume (1711–1776) during the Enlightenment who
first disconcerted thinkers over the fallibility of science, though his ideas were not
taken up until over a century later. Hume tackled the problems of pseudo-science and
belief in mysterious transcendental entities (both of these problems can surface in the
charged atmosphere of volcanic crises), when he argued we need look no further than
at ordinary experience, or if beyond that, in the refined experience of science. He said:
“a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence” (Magee, 1987). Some might argue
that an evidence-based approach is just another science-construct and reductionism,
as inappropriate for dealing with the dilemma of Vesuvius as appealing to San Gennaro
(the patron saint of Naples), when it is fundamentally a politico-social problem
requiring a political, not a scientific, solution. We would argue that dealing with a
future volcanic crisis without robust science-based decision- and risk-based tools is
equivalent to a ship leaving port without charts and navigation instruments.selecting data which supported their view and ignoring data which
did not (Fiske, 1984; Newhall and Punongbayan, 1996; Zelinsky and
Kosinski, 1991). The authorities were not prepared to accept any loss
of life from volcanic activity, but their precautionary approach was
criticised when the volcanic activity eventually declined without a
major eruption. Seventy thousand people were evacuated from Basse
Terre for nine months, a decision that led to bitter recrimination
amongst the scientists involved (Barberi and Gasparini, 1979). In our
view, the authorities made the right decision, given the inadequate
information available to the volcanologists, the uncertainty involved
and the potential consequences to the large number of people at risk,
especially as EXPLORIS scientists consider it to be a form of failed
eruption — much more serious than a “phreatic, non-magmatic, non-
event,” as some scientists viewed it at the time (Komorowski et al.,
2005).
The analytic approach to risk assessment employed in EXPLORIS
attempts to enumerate and quantify all the process and effects of the
eruptive hazards of a volcano that influence risk, a scientific challenge
that combines field data from eruptions with theoretical research on
volcanic processes. Alfred Lacroix (1904) pioneered the way in the
ruins of St Pierre, and major advances were to follow from 1980
onwards, most notably at the eruptions of Mount St Helens, Mount
Pinatubo, and the Soufrière Hills volcano, Montserrat.7 A growing
number of studies now constitute the evidence-base for decision
analysis and decision making in volcanic crises. We summarise some
of the main sources of information on which the analytical evidence
for each volcanic hazard is based later in this paper.
4. Formalising judgement in EXPLORIS
More detailed accounts of the EXPLORIS methods can be found in
the accompanying papers in this volume and so we present here just
an overview of the formal probabilistic reasoning and statistical
decision analysis tools that we used.
In brief, our EXPLORIS team of expert scientists began by
evaluating the available evidence on the past and present activity of
Vesuvius (including historic accounts and old chronicles) and the
published literature on eruptions from analogous volcanoes and their
environmental and human impacts. This accompanied the construc-
tion of a graphical display of all future types of eruptive activity (for a
given future time period, in this study ten years) in the form of an
event tree, which starts with Vesuvius moving from a state of repose
into a state of unrest and the different eruptive sequences unfolding
along the branches, or paths, of the tree.8 The branches were next
populated with conditional probabilities using an expert elicitation
method with the expert scientific group which allows for wide
divergences of individual opinion. The probabilities were based on
historical and geological data from Vesuvius and theoretical models of
magmatic and eruptive processes. Mathematical techniques were
used in formalising the expert judgement elicitation and to capture7 Alfred Lacroix (1863–1948) was the first scientist to undertake a systematic field
study of the impacts of an explosive eruption (at St Pierre) to in order to explain an
eruptive phenomenon which he was also the first to photograph (at Mont Pelée):
pyroclastic density currents (PDCs). His observations in the ruins of St Pierre were
recorded in his classic monograph (Lacroix, 1904) and were remarkably consistent
with those made a century later on the impacts of PDCs in Montserrat (Baxter et al.,
2005). A PDC has not struck a modern city and Lacroix's work remains a unique
reference and inspiration for analytical risk studies.
8 It has been recent practice of scientists in the USGS Cascades Observatory to draw
up event trees at volcanic crises and they have been found valuable in defining the
range of potential eruption types based on the known past behaviour of a volcano,
according to Dan Miller at the Naples final meeting of EXPLORIS. Newhall and Hoblitt
(2002) described the construction of a generic event tree at a hypothetical explosive
volcano, and derived branch probabilities from a range of global data sources and
references for estimating the individual risk to a hypothetical person living in a
hypothetical town.
Fig. 4. The EXPLORIS event tree for Vesuvius (Neri et al., 2008-this issue). The whole tree is shown, but the paper focuses on the branches for the main five explosive eruptions.
The hypothetical branch probabilities (and 5% and 95% credible intervals) were those obtained from the expert elicitation with EXPLORIS researchers (see text).
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Table 1
Emergency planning scenarios: the elicited key explosive eruptions and their
probabilities (5% and 90% credible intervals) and impacts (deaths) for emergency
planning and risk assessment. The numbers of deaths are hypothetical meaning that
they are the numbers that would occur if no evacuation or other mitigation measures
were instituted. The numbers are derived using the expert elicitation method (see text
for explanation)
Eruption type Probability
(%)
(5% and 95% credible intervals)
Hypothetical no. of deaths
(approximate scale)
A. Plinian 4% (0.003–23%) 10,000's
B. Sub-Plinian (1) 17% (1–49%) 1000's
C. Violent Strombolian 37% (8–87%) 100's
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modification, becomes an eruption scenario tree for emergency
planning purposes by adding the estimated or modelled losses
(buildings, lives) for each eruptive outcome. From this, three or
more main emergency scenarios and their probabilities were defined
for emergency planning purposes: these scenarios were developed in
more detail and refined by performing numerical modelling of
eruptive impacts for risk assessment and mitigation.
4.1. Constructing the event tree for Vesuvius
The event tree is essentially a timeline which starts with the state
of unrest and follows the different potential paths to eruption with
chance nodes at each step where the volcano can move to one of at
least two possible states of increasing or declining activity (Fig. 4). The
construction of thewhole event tree for Vesuvius tookmanymeetings
of EXPLORIS participants and represents a milestone in the scientific
understanding of the volcano (Neri et al., 2008-this issue). In dealing
with expected volcanic scenarios, the guide to the future behaviour of
a volcano lies in its past activity, assuming that the system
approximates to a state of equilibrium (Rosi, 1996), or steady state
(“stable boundary conditions”), over this long period. In EXPLORIS, we
drew on the current knowledge of Vesuvius and its behaviour in the
last twenty thousand years (Cioni et al., 2008-this issue). We regarded
this period as the most applicable for forecasting the volcano's
behaviour on the current state of knowledge if a state of unrest began
in the next ten years.
The branches of the tree are populated with conditional prob-
abilities and these are obtained from the group of scientists by a
formal elicitation method (Neri et al., 2008-this issue), which enables
multiple opinions to be combined using an elegant mathematical
weighting technique which gives greatest weight to experts who
are the highest scorers for “informativeness” (in effect, the precision
of their estimates) and for being “calibrated” (the validity of the
estimates). The event tree probabilities presented here and in Neri
et al. (2008-this issue) are the first outputs of our research which9 For a full treatment of epistemic and stochastic uncertainty, and subjective
probability, see Woo (1999). Uncertainty that can be ascribed to lack of knowledge is
epistemic, and that associated with randomness is stochastic or aleatory: the two
forms of uncertainty reflect the underlying duality of probability. Another way of
expressing epistemic uncertainty is by the “known unknowns” and the “unknown
unknowns”. We can try to reduce epistemic uncertainty by more research, for example,
into the known unknowns, but there will always be limits to our knowledge, as in the
unknown unknowns. In evidence-based science, probability can tell us how strong the
evidence is for some effect taking into account all the evidence at hand, not only the
evidence of one data set. Conditional probability expresses the probability of some
event conditional on the occurrence of some other event— that is, given that this other
event has occurred (the probability that event E occurs given that event F is known to
occur). Single-event probabilities — in statements like “the probability that an eruption
will happen in the next six months is X percent” — is a Bayesian use of probability as
logical reasoning (inference) in evidence-based science.exploited the wide range of expertise of EXPLORIS scientists and their
shared knowledge of the EXPLORIS research findings.
The tree can then be completed by incorporating losses at the end
of the paths; in EXPLORIS we have used deaths or severe casualties as
our end-points. These figures can be rough estimates in the first
instance (Table 1), or refined by pyroclastic flow and tephra fallout
modelling, as outlined below.
The tree displays five main types of explosive eruptions: the
Plinian, the sub-Plinian types 1 and 2, violent Strombolian and the
continuous ash emission (i.e. we neglect the possibility of phreatic
explosions). The last Plinian eruptionwas in AD 79 and was witnessed
by Pliny the Elder. The largest eruption of the last millennium at
Vesuvius was a sub-Plinian type 1 in 1631 andwas also documented in
chronicles at the time. The last sub-Plinian type 2 was in AD 512, but
we only have the stratigraphic record for this. The two largest
eruptions in the 20th century, in 1906 and 1944, were violent
Strombolian andwerewell recorded at the time. Our knowledge of the
continuous ash emission type is based on stratigraphic and composi-
tional evidence only.
4.2. Choosing the key eruptions for emergency planning and displaying
uncertainty
The event tree provides invaluable information on the main types
of explosive eruptions that can follow the state of unrest, but there are
no clear rules on how the eruptive types should best be ranked
according to their probabilities and consequences.10 All the eruptive
outcomes in the event tree have to be considered in emergency
planning and no realistic outcome should be discounted, but the most
serious or the most probable eruptions need to be given priority and
these are shown inTable 1, togetherwith their provisional probabilities
and scale of impacts. It is the case that overall the larger eruptions are
much less frequent than the smaller ones11 and the latter will have
more manageable impacts for targeted mitigation measures. A full
evaluation of the eruption scenarios is needed before Table 1 can be
completed with the involvement of emergency planners (see below).
Theworst scenario is a Plinian eruption, followedby the sub-Plinian
1 (1631-type) eruption, which is currently the reference eruption on
which the National Plan for Vesuvius is based (Dipartimento della
Protezione Civile,1995), and then themost likely but less severe event,
the violent Strombolian. For the sake of simplicity here we neglect the
sub-Plinian 2 scenario that is intermediate, in terms of scale and
probability, between the sub-Plinian 1 and the violent Strombolian.
The violent Strombolian is not associated with major pyroclastic flow
formation and so its consequences are relatively smaller than the other
types and the mitigation measures are different.
Table 1 shows that the probability of an explosive eruption being
on the scale of the 1631 reference eruption is considered to be four
times more likely, and the violent Strombolian nearly ten times more
likely, than the worst scenario eruption (the Plinian). However, the10 Risk ranking. Ranking eruptions using a single number derived by multiplying the
hazard probability by the number of casualties is tempting, but will lead to confusion
because of the inability of this method to distinguish between high frequency, low
consequence events and low frequency, high consequence events. Ranking emergency
scenarios should inevitably incorporate the judgement of the emergency planners.
11 Many phenomena follow an inverse relationship between their frequency and
magnitude known as a power law. The best example in earth sciences is the
Gutenberg–Richter relation for earthquakes. Globally, volcanic eruptions appear to
follow a similar distribution. The power law distribution gives more frequent large
eruptions than a bell (normal distribution) curve and produces a pattern characterised
by lots of small eruptions broken episodically by large eruptions. This does not help in
forecasting the next eruption at a volcano like Vesuvius, as we do not know its
underlying state at any given moment (see Footnote 3). Nor does it mean that
forecasting should err on the side of small eruptions and that an optimistic forecaster
of small events will on average do better than a pessimistic one. For example, the last
two eruptions at Rabaul volcano (Mount Tavurvur), Papua New Guinea (1937 and
1994), have both been moderately large.
Fig. 5. A branch of the event tree reproduced from Fig. 4 can also represent a scenario tree with elicited conditional probabilities shown on the separate branches. The numbers are
derived from the trial elicitation of EXPLORIS researchers as in Fig. 4.
Table 2
Elicited median lead times and 5% and 95% credible intervals from the start of the state
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by the broad credible intervals; this shows that there is a need to
revisit the knowledge base and repeat the elicitation to see if the
ranges can be reduced and to identify the reasons for the wide
discrepancies of opinion shown here. If the intervals turned out to be
irreducible, it would indicate the large epistemic uncertainty in the
scientific knowledge and reflect the limits of our current knowledge.
Marzocchi et al. (2004) adopted a statistical approach using an event
tree for quantifying probabilities of volcanic events and found a non-
negligible (1–20%) chance that the next eruption could be larger than
the Emergency Plan reference eruption, which is consistent with our
findings (Neri et al., 2008-this issue).
The same information is presented in the form of a branch of the
event tree and this time taking into account the conditional
probabilities (Fig. 5). Multiplying the probabilities along the path
provides a new perspective, with a surprisingly low probability of the
state of unrest ending with one of the key eruptions. This way of
presenting the data shows that the most likely outcome of the state
of unrest is for the volcano to return to repose, rather than erupt. If,
instead, the course is towards an eruption then, according to the event
tree, it is about three times more likely to be an explosive rather
than an effusive event. For presentational purposes, it is best to use
frequencies rather than probabilities12. In other words, one in a
hundred states of unrest would culminate in a Plinian eruption, and
five in a hundred with a sub-Plinian 1. Only one in ten states of unrest
will end in a violent Strombolian eruption, even though this is the
most likely explosive eruption. Overall, only six out of a hundred states
of unrest will end with an eruption accompanied by pyroclastic flows,
whereas one in three states of unrest will end with an eruption
accompanied by tephra fallout (all of the explosive eruptions are
accompanied by tephra fall).
As displayed in Table 2, the development of pyroclastic density
currents (PDCs) could, according to our experts, take place around12 Minds are adapted to talk about frequencies of important events, not their
probabilities or percentages. Few people walk about with probabilities in their heads,
for forecasting the weather or even gambling (odds are preferred by punters). Natural
frequencies can be shown to facilitate inferences made on the basis of numerical
information (Gigerenzer, 2002).47 days into the crisis and this phase could last about 5 h, and the tephra
fallout begin after 46 days, but both of these values (50% percentiles)
have wide credible intervals reflecting the uncertainty of the experts'
estimates. The duration of the eruption (54 days from the onset of
unrest) is short, but is also surrounded by large uncertainty.
If further work confirms these preliminary estimates, decision
makers would have plenty to think about. For example, as there is a
reasonable likelihood that the state of unrest might not end in an
eruption at all according toTable 1, how soon should the area around the
volcano (the Red Zone) containing 500,000 people be evacuated,
especially if the probability of a pyroclastic flow eruption is as low as
stated? Should the area of the Red Zone be based on the National Plan's
reference sub-Plinian eruption or the larger, but less likely, Plinian event,
whichwould impact on an even larger population? In Table 2, the limits
of the credibility intervals are notional 5% percentile values, which can
be interpreted as a 95% chance that the fallout phase will start after
4 days or longer into the state of unrest and the PDC phase after almost
the same time. But this means that there is a small chance that Vesuvius
could be in full eruption within under a week of the announcement of
the state of unrest, which might be before the evacuation of the area is
complete and have disastrous consequences. If so, how far should the
emergency plans extend and should they include search and rescue
planning for casualties? The mid-duration of the PDC phase is expected
to last 5 h — short enough for it to be feasible to be followed by an
effective search and rescue operation for casualties and trapped
individuals caught in the PDC and the fallout phases. Finally, if an early
and full precautionary evacuationwas undertaken the officials involved
in the decision would need to be aware of the small chance that the
eruption might not occur until over a year into the state of unrest — inof unrest to the given hazard event, showing duration of the PDC phase and the whole
eruption. The numbers are derived from the same expert elicitation as in Table 1
Tephra fall on towns 4.3–46–435 days
PDCs impacting towns 4.33–47–444 days
Whole duration of eruption 7.5–54–515 days
Mean duration of PDC phase 0.2–5.0–86 h
Fig. 6. Map of circumvesuvian area showing the Vesuvius crater and Mount Somma, with the towns affected by the 1906 and 1944 eruptions.
462 P.J. Baxter et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 178 (2008) 454–473practice, dangerously long for a population of this size to be held in
evacuation in the absence of threatening activity4,13.
Answers to these and other important planning questions are not
straightforward and would need to be based on an understanding of
the eruption scenarios (see below) and not just on these elicited
“estimated occurrence probability” values.
5. Descriptions of the explosive eruption scenarios
A large body of historical evidence exists on the eruptions of
Vesuvius since the sub-Plinian eruption in 1631.14 Cioni et al. (2008-13 The uncertainty over forecasting eruptive events for practical decision making is in
parallel with the problem of medical diagnosis, in that both are subject to false alarms
and false reassurances, with the potential for making costly or deadly mistakes. One
application of evidence-based medicine at the bedside is to use Bayesian statistical
methods for determining the probability that patient has a specific disease when the
clinician is faced with a positive test result, or set of results, a task not fundamentally
very different from volcanologists interpreting eruptive precursors in a crisis, a
comparison which is found scattered about the volcanological literature. In the days
before scientific medicine, with its statistical methods and the availability of medical
treatment that we have today, the reputation of the doctor depended upon making an
accurate diagnosis, which was fraught with uncertainty, and forecasting the patient's
outcome in terms of life and death as a balance of probabilities: the teachings of a
celebrated physician of that era, Sir William Osler (1849–1919), who would have
embraced evidence-based medicine, invoked young doctors to be humble in their
ability to do this with the reminder that “medicine is a science of uncertainty and an
art of probability.” (Silverman et al., 2008). An urgent challenge for volcanology is to
develop probabilistic methods for volcanic forecasting in a domain that is “data-poor”
compared to modern medicine and deals with relatively rare events — a fundamental
difference between the two disciplines.
14 Most famous of all observers of the volcano was the English diplomat Sir William
Hamilton, whose stay in the Bourbon capital of Naples as Royal Envoy from 1764 to 1798
was at a time when Vesuvius was in a state of semi-persistent activity and its dramatic
sights inspired artists, thinkers and the scientists of the day. As the first scientist to
recognise that explanations for volcanic activity should be sought by interpreting the
evidence from extensive observations in thefield and not, as he said, from the comfort of a
chair, he was the first empirical volcanologist. He became aware of the negative
consequences of volcanismwhen he was present at the three notable lava flow eruptions
in 1771,1774 and theworst, in 1794, which destroyed Torre del Greco. After 1631, and until
1906, Vesuvius displayed frequent explosive activity in twomain styles: periods of effusive
Strombolian activity and violent Strombolian eruptions, with periods of inactivity not
exceeding seven years. During the past two centuries of activity, the 1822 and 1906
eruptions were both violent Strombolian and were the greatest eruptions of the 19th and
20th centuries, respectively. Since the 1944 eruption, the conduit has remained sealed and
the volcano has been in a state of repose.this issue) describes the eruptive history of the volcano over the last
20,000 years and the scenarios for emergency planning are based on
their paper (including Cioni et al., 2003), as well as selected reports.
5.1. Plinian and sub-Plinian eruptions
The largest, most recent Plinian eruption of Vesuvius (the Avellino)
occurred in the Bronze Age (3500 BP), but the best studied by
volcanologists is the famous AD 79 event, on which this summary is
based. In a future eruption the opening phase marked by vulcanian-
type explosions and ash-charged convection columns could be
expected to last no more than a few hours, and the impacts would
be confined to the vent and upper slopes (although ash could produce
significant problems even at larger distances). The main phase with a
stratospheric eruption column could last several hours (20 h in AD 79,
according to Pliny the Younger's account). Fallout in the proximal and
medial sectors would be up to several meters and contain coarse
grained pumice, leading to roof collapses; damage from ash fallout
would extend to hundreds of kilometres downwind. Two types of
PDCs can occur in the late stages of this phase, as what occurred in the
AD 79 eruption: low volume, dilute flows from partial column collapse
with run-outs up to 9 km, e.g., as far as Pompeii, and denser and hotter
flows, with similar run-out distances, at the end of the phase arising
from column collapse. After the climax, phreato-magmatic explosions
continued for days, but themain event generated was caldera collapse
associated with strong seismic activity and the most energetic PDCs
extending for 20 km or more destroying the area around the volcano.
Lighter, phreato-magmatic activity accompanied the waning of the
eruption, which took weeks.
The sub-Plinian 1 eruption has the same phases as the Plinian, but
with lower magnitude and intensity; the duration is shorter and
the area impacted smaller. The hazards and emergency management
issues are the same. The last two sub-Plinian 1 events were in AD 472
(Pollena) and 1631 (reference eruption), the latter being well
documented in contemporary chronicles. In AD 1631, the opening
phase lasted only 2 h and was not accompanied by PDCs. The main
eruption column (height 20–21 km) was sustained for 8 h. Thick (1–
2 m), coarse grained pumice and scoria (coarse lapilli) deposits were
emplaced downwind in the proximal sectors, with ash fallout causing
problems for hundreds of kilometres. Enhanced ash sedimentation
15 The most graphic account is by the volcanologist Frank Perret (1924), who makes
all the other reports look staid in comparison. He spent most of the eruption at the
Royal Vesuvian Observatory (Osservatorio Vesuviano), only 2.5 km from the summit
crater and his account is essential reading to learn (and feel) the violence of the
eruption, in which he and his fearless colleagues came close to death, on one occasion
when the Observatory was enveloped in a gas cloud (one young man in a group of
locals sheltering in the building died from its effects). Other reports include: Cimmino
(2001); Hobbs (1906); Lacroix (1906); Johnston-Lavis (1909). For more on Frank Perret
and the 1906 eruption see T. Gidwitz (2005): http://www.vesuvius.tomgidwitz.com/
html/10__the_eruption_-_phase_iii.html. This report in the London Times on April 11
1906 graphically summarises the “distressing scenes” around Vesuvius: Last night was
a quiet one in Naples. On Sunday night there was a notable diminution in the activity of
the volcano, which is now still further decreasing. The intermittent explosions and
continuous rumble below are only to be heard at comparatively close quarters: the change
of wind carries the dense cloud of ashes out to sea, stretching a thick vale between Naples
itself and the coast line of Castellammare and Sorrento: and, what is more important, the
slow course of the lava streams is stayed at Torre Annunziata and Torre del Greco, though
there was still a discernible movement this morning in the stream which branched off near
Torre Annunziata towards Pompeii. Professor Mattucci, who has regained his post of
observation, reports a decided amelioration in the symptoms and has expressed his belief
that the worst is over. Naples has today resumed its normal life, though very far from its
normal aspect. Though the ashes have ceased for the moment to fall on the town, they lie
inches deep in all the streets, rising in clouds of fine impalpable dust and thickly coating
both houses and wayfarers. It appears a grey city inhabited by grey ghosts, which is at least
an improvement upon Saturday and Sunday nights, when the threatening thunder of the
volcano, a thick pall of darkness torn by distant flashes of volcanic explosions and a
suffocating atmosphere made it resemble an ante-chamber of hell. The Neapolitans too,
have taken courage again, and the pitiful little processions bearing a body image or picture,
sometimes composed of only a dozen or so of half-distraught peasant women, have now
deserted the streets, though even last night they were still to be seen here and there. If the
appearance of Naples is not fraught enough, that of the threatened towns is most wretched.
Torre Annunziata seems utterly abandoned save by a few carabinieri and troops, who
mount guard in its empty streets. Torre del Greco is in little better ease. Resina and Portici
suffered less in the general panic, but were deserted temporarily by a good many of the
inhabitants, who are now returning to their homes. Bosco-Trecase is destroyed. The villages
on the north-east of Vesuvius–Ottajano, San Giuseppe, and Terzigno — I have not yet been
able to see, but from all accounts their condition is sufficiently deplorable. From San
Giuseppe is reported the only loss of life. The roof of the old church, long known to be
unsafe, succumbed, it is supposed, to the added weight of ashes and volcanic debris and fell
in, burying in its ruins a great number of women and old people who were gathered in
prayer to avert the destruction of their town. According to the last accounts 37 dead bodies
have been extricated, besides a number of injured. A report of a similar disaster at Terzigno
is now denied, though that town has also suffered severely from the hail of redhot stones
and debris.
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also received ash fall and was reportedly in darkness for two days.
Contemporary authors emphasised that many roof collapses were
triggered by the wet ashes, which within about 10 km of the crater
attained a primary thickness of around 20–40 cm.
In the collapsing, or fountaining, stage that follows themain phase,
the generation of very hot (N300 °C), dense, topographically
controlled PDCs that extended to the sea from Portici to Torre del
Annunziata, continued for 2 h in 1631 in associationwith the collapse
of the summit portion of the volcano. Seven main “rivers of fire” or
PDC lobes flowed in a south-west direction along valleys, probably
because of the barrier-effect of Monte Somma deflecting the PDCs
away from the north-east side. About 4000 people are said to have
died in the eruption, mainly from the actions of the PDCs, but
Guidoboni (this volume) quotes a lower figure of under one thousand;
it is certain that many thousands did evacuate to safety. The final
phreato-magmatic phase can be accompanied by heavy ash fall as far
as 40 km downwind (AD 472). Heavy rainstorms triggered by the
eruption (due to ash acting as nuclei for raindrop formation, or the
condensation of steam released from the crater during the phreato-
magmatic phase) caused floods and warm lahars that coursed down
the volcano in many directions and were amongst the most
destructive phenomena (Rosi et al., 1993); these secondary hazards
are outside the scope of EXPLORIS. In 1631 the secondary hazards of
lahars and floods affected the plain at the northern foot of the volcano
and the valleys of the Apennines (40–60 km downwind) for days.
Several sub-Plinian 2 eruptions have occurred in the last
3900 years, the last in AD 512. Here, we shall regard it as a smaller
version of the sub-Plinian eruption andwithoutmajor pyroclastic flow
activity. As the thickness of the fallout deposit can be greater than
10 cm at least as far as 15–25 km away from the event, roof collapse
would be the primary hazard. But even small volume, dilute PDC
dispersed close to the vent can be hazardous due to the very dense
urbanisation of the volcanoes slopes.
The density of the tephra can range from 500–1500 kg/m2, being
less dense in the Plinian fallout. The rate of accumulation of the tephra
deposit is relevant to the hazard. For the same three eruption types the
accumulation rates are given by Cioni as 10–20, 5–15 and 5–15 cm/h,
respectively. Such rates are so high as to make escape impossible once
the fallout has started, due to low visibility. The 1631 fallout also
contained numerous clasts large enough to cause direct injury as far as
8–9 km from the vent; walking outside would be highly dangerous
without head protection. The occurrence of rain at the same time
would lead to mud-like fallout which could not be tolerated for long
outside, either.
To summarise, in these highly devastating eruptions mitigation for
a repeat event would need to be directed at accurate risk zoning to
define evacuation limits to protect against PDCs, and measures to
protect against direct risks to life from tephra fallout in sectors
extending at least 10 km from the summit vent, with the direction of
the main fallout depending upon the state of the tropospheric winds
at the time of the eruption.
5.2. The violent Strombolian eruption
The two main eruptions of Vesuvius in the 20th century, in 1906
and 1944, were violent Strombolian, the latter being the last eruption
before the present repose period. Four other eruptions of similar type
and magnitude as the 1906 event had occurred since 1631, though the
impact in 1906 was the most severe in its lethality and effect on the
population. The main paroxysmal phase is often preceded by effusive
activity (from the crater or lateral fissures) and followed by a phreato-
magmatic phase ending in a period of long-lasting (days to months)
ash emission. Lava fountains rising up several kilometres characterise
the main phase, which can last hours to days. The duration of the lava
fountains can be tens of minutes to hours and they leave thick depositsof lapilli or scoria along a narrow sector of the dispersion axis.
Episodes of inclined lava fountains can also occur, inducing unexpect-
edly fast fallout deposition and showers of rocks (blocks) over
restricted areas.
The eruption in 1906 is of particular interest as it may be regarded
as an example of a “worst” scenario for a violent Strombolian eruption
with the implications for modern-day living in a future eruption
capable of being drawn from the contemporary accounts15. It began on
4 April after years of summit activity at Vesuvius and started with lava
emissions from the summit and the southern flank accompanied by
frequent explosions and ash emission. The main lava flow travelled
3.5 km to Boscotrecase (Fig. 6). In the evening of 7 April, the explosions
became very loud and could be heard in Naples; volcanogenic
earthquakes were experienced throughout the Vesuvius region and
caused panic in Naples. Lava fountaining began late at night and was
directed towards Ottaviano, with a storm of lapilli and clasts hitting
and breaking the windows, many facing away from the volcano
(Perret, 1924). People started taking to the roads and most eventually
escaped the town, despite the complete obscurity, protecting their
heads with various objects such as baskets, boards or chairs; those
unable to walk took cover in barns (Cimmino, 2001). By 0300 on 8
April the houses started to cave in under the weight of fallout, which
began to cease around 0600. The town received about 80 cm of fallout,
but this accumulated to depths up to 2 m near buildings, probably
because of it falling off the pitch-roofs. Piles of lapilli were sometimes
seen on the level of the first floors of the houses due to this effect.
Hundreds of houses were totally destroyed under the weight of
tephra, with hardly any left intact, and three churches collapsed (no
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floors were burst in and walls burst-out (Chester and Duncan, 2007).
In nearby San Giuseppe and San Gennaro, the lapilli shower had begun
in the middle of the night and went on for some 4 h in absolute
darkness. About 1 m of lapilli accumulated overnight on the roof of
San Guiseppe church; at 0915 on April 8 the roof caved in killing 105
people and severely injuring 90 more, who were sheltering there; a
hundred others escaped. There were a further 106 deaths in Ottaviano
and San Giuseppe, most as a result of the collapse of flat and tiled roofs
of stucco houses, and a few due to people being struck by bombs and
falling clasts. About 60 people were seriously injured. Overall about
300 people died and a similar number were seriously injured.
Rescuers managed to dig out several people alive (Chester and
Duncan, 2007).
Tephra also affected a wide area to the west of the volcano and up
to 15 cm ash fell in Naples (the discrepancies in some reports, which
suggest only 2 cm thickness, is probably due to accumulations of ash
from roofs against buildings, etc., being included in the estimates),
causing the collapse of the roofs of the Monte Oliveto market and a
few poorly constructed houses; ten people died. Swirling winds kept
Naples and the western and northern circumvesuvian area shrouded
in ash for most of the eruption. In Naples the people had to protect
their eyes from the ash with glasses, celluloid plates or other devices,
with the better off carrying opened umbrellas (Hobbs, 1906). At Torre
del Greco, Resina and Portici, the ash depth was reported as 15 cm
(Hobbs, 1906), or as much as 45 cm, according to Delmé-Radcliffe
(Chester and Duncan, 2007). Fear drove 100,000 people to self-
evacuate from Naples on April 8 and 3000 people left Portici on ships
sent by the navy, with thousands of others making their own way to
Naples to escape the violent rain of ash and lapilli which lasted 30 h at
Torre del Greco. A lava flow destroyed parts of the communes of
Boscotrecase and Boscoreale. The whole eruption lasted from 4th to
20th April, with further ashfalls, but lahars and floods continued to
disrupt the impacted areas for several years afterwards and caused a
few more deaths.
The 1906 eruption had a much greater impact on the local
population than the one in 1944, but then the fallout was much more
plentiful in the earlier event. In 1944 the fallout was mainly directed
by low-level winds towards Salerno, with the heaviest deposit at
Terzigno and Pompeii along the dispersion axis marked by the 35 cm
isopach. The 10 cm isopach was located at 20 km from the crater. At
Terzigno, many aircraft at an Allied Air Force base were damaged by
the rain of ash and lapilli. Chester et al. (2007) have made the most
detailed summary yet of the eruption from available sources. The
eruption beganwith the crater filling with lava and then it spilled over
the rim and headed towards San Sebasiano at 1630 on 18 March.
Another flow went as far as 3 km towards Torre del Greco. The lava
reached San Sebasiano at 0300 on 21 March and eventually destroyed
the town. The lava moved at 50 to 100 m/h, at which speeds people
learned not to panic. At 1700 on 21 March a lava fountain began and
there were about 8 episodes of fire fountaining overall with durations
of between 18 and 40 min, ending on 0730 on 22 March. More
sustained explosive activity with ash falls began on 22 March, when
there was a large eruptive column accompanied by an electrical storm
and frequent seismic activity. All the 21 deaths in this eruption
resulted from tephra-induced roof collapse in the Pagani/Nocera area
(within the 35 cm isopach), where the buildings were typically mud/
adobe, and one person was killed in Terzigno by a falling rock.
These two events show how in a future violent Strombolian
eruption a single sector can be most impacted by directed lapilli
fallout from lava fountains, depending upon the eruption dynamics
and the direction of low-level winds at the time. Nevertheless, ash
fallout could produce major impact even at the regional level
depending on eruption duration and wind directions. No major
pyroclastic flow activity occurs and mitigation in the main is about
protecting houses and people against localised, very heavy lapilli andclast fallout and volcanic ash. Lava flows emitted from low-level vents,
whose location cannot be predicted, can move quite rapidly, but no
one died from the main flows in 1906 and 1944. Great explosions and
a period of earthquakes led to panic in Naples and many towns in the
circumvesuvian area, leading to spontaneous mass population move-
ments, in 1906. Important questions are: what would be the impact of
a 1906 or 1944 event today, given the denser population present and
more modern housing and infrastructure, and how large is the scope
for mitigation in such an eruption? To what extent would modern life
(health, transport, lifelines, businesses, etc.) in the Naples megalopolis
be disrupted? One aspect addressed below under risk modelling is the
resistance of the roofs of buildings to the fallout and the risk to their
hypothetical occupants.
5.3. Continuous ash emissions in the final eruptive phases
The ash emissions in the final phase of the Plinian, sub-Plinian and
violent Strombolian events could last for months and cause disruption
over wide areas. The prolonged ash falls that followed the last phases
of the AD 79 and 1631 eruptions gave layers impervious to rain water
that added to the risk of flooding and lahar generation. Other events
characterised by prolonged ash emission have recurred at Vesuvius
since the 3,900 BP eruption of the Avellino pumice. Many of these
events are recorded in the products of the activity in the Middle Ages,
with thicknesses ranging from a few centimetres to decimetres in
the currently inhabited area at the base of Vesuvius. The eruptive
processes involved are not fully understood, but they could also be
associated with effusive activity close to the vent.
The fallout of low-level ash plumes emitted over periods of several
months of phreato-magmatic activity would comprise dense ash
(1300–2400 kg/m3) and might well have corrosive properties from
adsorbed acids. The effects on infrastructure and transport in future
events could have widespread temporary economic and social
consequences, and the fine fallout could cause widespread acute
respiratory disorders amongst the population.
5.4. The next eruption of Vesuvius
In summary, it is not known when the present repose period of
Vesuvius that began following the last eruption in 1944 will end, but
the onset of signs of renewed activity will constitute a new state of
unrest if the activity appears to be escalating towards an eruption. If
an explosive eruption eventually occurs, the Plinian and sub-Plinian
eruptions would have similar opening phases lasting at least a few
hours and marked by Vulcanian explosions and tephra fallout
confined to the upper areas of the volcano. Earthquakes are likely
given that the conduit is now sealed and explosive energy will be
needed to clear a vent. The eruption centre is likely to be in the present
crater area, but it could form elsewhere. The main phases of Plinian or
sub-Plinian 1 eruptions would be devastating within the Red Zone,
with extensive impacts due to fallout and pyroclastic flows, and the
secondary hazards of floods and lahars. Recovery from the eruption in
the circumvesuvian area would take many years.
The most probable case is the violent Strombolian eruption, which
is likely to begin with earthquakes and effusive activity (in the crater
or, less commonly, from a lateral vent and a fast-moving lava flow
extending into populated areas) and moderate ash emissions,
accompanied by loud shocks and explosions, but the main hazard to
life is from the lapilli and ash fallout from paroxysms of lava
fountaining which are mostly directed along a narrow dispersion
axis. The last phase contains strong ash emissions subject to low-level
winds, the fallout from which could cause major disruption and
respiratory health problems in the affected areas for at least many
days, if not months, over areas considerably more extensive than the
current Red Zone. In contrast to Plinian or sub-Plinian 1 eruptions, the
recovery phase would likely be over months, rather than years.
17 Vulnerability. A general definition of vulnerability in natural disasters is the
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to
anticipate, copewith, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Wisner et al.,
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continuous ash emission, but solitary ash emission eruptions can
also probably last for months, whilst the main eruption phase is quite
short-lived.
5.5. Evacuation decision making
The eruption of Mount Pinatubo involved the hasty evacuation of
tens of thousands of people who would have been killed in the
numerous and large pyroclastic flows if they had delayed beyond a
few more hours. This rapid flight of so many people is in contrast to
the advanced warning anticipated at the closely monitored Vesu-
vius16. The decision on when to evacuate is a fraught one which has
to be taken by emergency officials and agreed by politicians, based
on the advice of a technical committee of volcanologists who are
interpreting the monitoring data being collected on the state of
the volcano. The uncertainties already described should be at the
forefront of the decision-making process. Few experts (or politicians)
have experience of evacuating large populations, which is an
important reason why risk tools to support such decision making
are needed.
A major explosive eruption with a high probability of occurrence
should, all things being equal, have a greater influence on the decision
to evacuate the population at risk than a low probability. A procedure
of progressive updating of the probability outputs of the event tree
during the state of unrest would lend itself to being incorporated into
an evacuation decisionmodel of some kind, but the rules for doing this
are still not established (Woo, 2008). A lengthy state of unrest would
undoubtedly lead to a shift in the behaviour of the population and a
disruption of economic activity whilst a threat of an eruption lasts,
and these and other unknown influences still mean that an evacuation
decision has to be a political judgement based on the best scientific
evidence from the monitoring of the volcano and robust risk
assessment tools.
Emergency planning in advance of a crisis should employ
numerical modelling of the consequences of the above scenarios
based on the past eruptions and apply them to the modern urban
environment and its lifelines. This would refine the eruption scenarios
on which the evacuation decision would be based, to show just how
extensive the consequences of inaction could be, as well as defining
the areas around the volcano at most risk.
6. Vulnerability and numerical consequencemodelling at Vesuvius
Oneof themainaimsof theEXPLORISprojectwas todevelopexamples
of how the impacts of the primary eruptive hazards in the main
emergency planning scenarios, based as they are on past eruptions,
could be numerically modelled for modern-day conditions in the
circumvesuvian area. The purpose of these models is for risk assessment
and for refining the consequences to be expected in a future eruption in a
form that can be plotted on geographical information system (GIS) maps.
This required the development in EXPLORIS of innovative PDC and tephra
modelling, combinedwith vulnerability functions for the actual buildings
and their occupants in the hazard areas around the volcano. Previous
published studies have mostly used generic methodologies for hazard16 The rapid movement in the face of an impending eruption is summed up by the
commemorative plaque theViceroyofNaples ordered should beattached to theGranatello
in Portici after the1631 eruption as awarning to future generations. The advice ended: So if
you have any sense pay attention to the eloquent advice on this tablet— don't concern yourself
with your house orwith packing bags— put out to sea. In the devastating eruption of Rabaul,
1994, in Papua New Guinea, the population of Rabaul (about 15,000 people) rapidly
evacuated itself with only a few hours to spare and without waiting for the authorities to
declare an evacuation, as the continuous felt earthquakes and ground uplift were
reminiscent of the last major eruption in 1937.assessment and mapping only, and without quantifying vulnerability.17
This section will not repeat the modelling methods described in the
accompanying papers in this volume (Esposti Ongaro et al., this volume;
Macedonio et al., 2008-this issue), butwill focus on the inputs of relevance
to mitigation.
Uniquely, EXPLORIS developed a risk-based approach by using a
detailed inventory of the building typologies in the circumvesuvian area,
including the vulnerability of their key elements to PDCs, tephra fall and
earthquakes. Descriptions of the building stock and population of the
circumvesuvian area, and their vulnerabilities to PDCs and tephra fall,
have already been published (Spence et al., 2004a,b, 2005a,b). It is
noteworthy here that around 70% of people live in apartment blocks,
mostly constructed in the post-war period. These are of reinforced frame
construction, with reinforced concrete slab roofs and floors. Buildings
built before the 20th century, inhabited by 16% of the population, are
traditionally more vulnerable and nowadays have pitched tile roofs of
timber construction, flat terrace roofs of steel joists covered in concrete,
or modern reinforced concrete slabs. Those built in the early 20th
century may have had vaulted roofs originally, like the older buildings,
which are now replaced by reinforced concrete roofs or tile roofs
supported by steel trusses.
The general principle of incorporating building and human
vulnerability in risk estimation in EXPLORIS is as follows. A
mathematical vulnerability function combining physical vulnerability
parameters (that define the impact on the building of certain peak
intensity values of the hazard parameter) with human vulnerability
parameters (that define the probability of human casualties for
different levels of physical damage) was developed for use at all the
EXPLORIS volcanoes. Different vulnerability curves apply to different
types of construction. The vulnerability methodologies for buildings
and human occupants in PDCs (Spence et al., 2005a; Zuccaro et al.,
2008-this issue) and in tephra falls (Spence et al., 2005b; Zuccaro
et al., 2008-this issue) have been described.
6.1. Vulnerability in pyroclastic flows
Pyroclastic flows and surges (PDCs) are high temperature clouds of
erupted particles and gases capable of flowing down the slopes of
volcanoes at high speeds. They are the most destructive forces in
explosive eruptions and have caused the most deaths. At Vesuvius
they have ranged from dilute surges (single or repeated pulses lasting
only a few minutes) to dense pyroclastic flows lasting over an hour or
more and leaving thick deposits. They are formed by partial or total
collapse of the eruption column, as in the AD 79 event, and by “boiling
over” the crater rim, as in the sub-Plinian 1 eruption of AD 1631.
Numerous dilute and transitional surge-pyroclastic flow types of PDC
of varying intensity occurred in the AD 79 eruption. The temperatures
of the PDCs inferred from their deposits at 5–6 km from the crater
have ranged from 250 °C to well over 350 °C, which is above the
combustion temperature of most flammablematerials. As well as their2004). The literature on volcanic riskmanagement has developed over the years a specific
terminology since Fournier d'Albe's paper (1979) first introduced the nowwell known risk
equation:
Risk ¼ hazard4value4vulnerability:
In EXPLORIS we use these terms as follows. Hazard is the probability of a particular
area being affected by the damaging volcanic event (or a specific hazardous action)
within a given time period; value is the population of buildings or individuals in the
hazard area; and vulnerability is the proportion of the value that is most susceptible, or
most likely to be lost, to the hazard. For example, mitigation, or risk reduction,
measures could include lowering value in the equation through the timely evacuation
of potentially hazardous areas, or by reducing vulnerability by strengthening lifelines,
roads and buildings against damage from volcanogenic earthquakes or ash falls.
18 Injury from the effects of convective heat is an almost uniquely volcanic problem
which is encountered in PDCs. There are good data on burns caused by fires or the
direct contact of the skin with hot objects, as well as the effects of radiant heat, but
data are sparse on heat injury and skin burns from contact with intensely hot
atmospheres. Examples include the effects in people in air raid shelters in the mass
bombing raids of cities in the Second World War and in passengers escaping from
burning aircraft on the ground. New survival curves were prepared for EXPLORIS by D.
Purser.
19 Fire spread and super-fires (firestorms and conflagrations) are unlikely to occur
unless there is considerable structural damage to reinforced concrete buildings in
these densely populated areas accompanied by numerous large individual fires.
Further work is needed to model the conditions that can lead to fire-spread in the
circumvesuvian area.
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upon their density and speed.
EXPLORIS has mostly focused on one type of PDC, namely the
dilute, violent PDC of small volume (covering areas less than 10 km2
with small-thickness deposits), such as the surge that destroyed St
Pierre in 1902, and the lateral blast at Mount St Helens, 1980, which
are the PDCs most likely to be encountered by emergency planners
(Baxter et al., 2005). The more dilute PDCs in the AD 79 eruption
would likely be this type as well, such as the first surge to hit
Herculaneum, whose intense heat killed instantly hundreds of people
sheltering in the caves by the beach, but caused little damage to
structures (Mastrolorenzo et al., 2001). Three of these “prototype”
PDCs were erupted on three separate occasions from the Soufrière
Hills volcano, Montserrat, in 1997, and detailed studies of their
impacts on buildings have provided important clues to the vulner-
ability of urban areas to PDCs in explosive eruptions, as well as
updating the classical work by Lacroix at St Pierre7 (Baxter et al.,
2005).
The defining features of the dilute PDC, at least by the time its run-
out reaches inhabited areas, are comparatively low dynamic pressure
(1–5 kPa), moderate temperatures (250 °C or less), low to moderate
density (5–15 kg/m3) and relatively low velocity (b100 km/h). In this
type of PDC total destruction of a built-up area is not inevitable
throughout its entire run-out, and developing methods for defining
which areas are most at risk and what types of mitigation measures
which could be feasible to adopt was a goal of EXPLORIS. Previous PDC
modelling of the sub-Plinian reference eruptionwas two-dimensional
and indicated that the PDCs in this eruption were like the prototype
when their run-out reached the main conurbations along the coast
at 5–7 km from the crater (Dobran et al., 1994; Todesco et al., 2002;
Esposti Ongaro et al., 2002). EXPLORIS developed the first three-
dimensional model of a PDC at Vesuvius (Neri et al., 2007; Esposti
Ongaro et al., this volume) and the first simulations confirmed these
findings and also showed how the Mt Somma deflected the PDCs in
the sub-Plinian 1 reference eruption over awide area across the flanks
towards the sea. In the actual eruption in 1631, the pyroclastic flows
were channelled in valleys and would have been much more
destructive than the dilute PDC, as their valley-filling lobes showed
thicknesses of 4–5 m along the main flow axis and appear to have
been deposited as a single flow unit.
There are three impact states of importance as the dynamic
pressure against a building increases: first the glazed openings fail,
then the shuttered openings and solid doors, and finally the wall
panels (Spence et al., 2007). Temperature and entrained missiles will
also add to the risk of glazing failure. Failure of the openings allows the
incursion of the hot PDC which will kill or seriously injure the
occupants, and ignite fires when the ash comes into contact with
furnishings. Multiple failures of openings will also allowmore air in to
fan the flames. Where the buildings are sheltered, or the windows are
protected, the rate of infiltration of the hot gas–particle mixture into
the intact envelope of the building will depend upon how normally it
is well sealed against the weather (the infiltration rate through the
normal ventilation process is specific to the style of building and
climate), but the temperature and hot particle concentrationwill keep
rising inside rooms depending upon the duration of the flow of the
PDC outside the building and the frequency of arrival of any further
pulses of the PDC. Gradually lethal levels of temperature (hyperther-
mia and burns) and particle concentrations (asphyxia) will be attained
with prolonged PDC activity. The temperature flux incorporates the
external temperature of the PDC and its duration, combined with the
ventilation rate of the building, as the best parameters for predicting
casualties in hypothetical occupants in an eruption (Spence et al.,
2007; Spence et al., 2008-this issue).
Human casualties will arise amongst those caught outside in the
heat and irrespirable atmosphere of the moving current, with any
survivors suffering from severe burns to the skin and the respiratorytract (Baxter, 1990). The dynamic force of the PDC could be greater
than a strongwind and the blast will knock people over or thrust them
against walls; dirt and missiles from the ground become entrained in
the current to add to its density and violent impact. Survival outside in
a dilute PDC at Vesuvius should be regarded as impossible, unless the
individual is in a well-sheltered position at the distal end of the run-
out.
For the first time, a human survival curve was used as a
vulnerability function for exposure to convective heat from the direct
heat of a PDC or the rising temperature as the PDC infiltrates its way
into houses which have remained intact against the impacts of the
dynamic pressure and any missiles entrained in its flow. In addition to
those killed by the incursion of the PDC through one or more
openings, the numbers of hypothetical occupants who survive with
burns can be estimated, as well as thosewho die or are injured by heat
due to the infiltrating hot gas–particle mixture into the houses that
remain intact, depending upon the duration of the flow. The escape
times fromhigh-rise buildings on fire can also bemodelled to estimate
numbers of fire victims.18
Boarding and sealing windows against the incursion of a PDC
would constitute a mitigation strategy. Hurricane boards placed to
cover windows were found to be an unintentionally effective device in
the largest PDC event onMontserrat, where evacuated houses avoided
fire damage (Baxter et al., 2005). In the Red Zone simple measures
such as strong window shutters or plywood boards capable of
withstanding 5–10 kPa lateral loading could protect the interior of
the house against a dilute PDC and prevent the whole house catching
fire. People could also survive in those circumstances inside a building
if the duration of the PDC was short (less than 10–20 min) and later
make their escape, but this could not be proposed as a safe alternative
to evacuation. Multiple fires in unprotected buildings would break out
in the area impacted by a PDC and the potential for the spread of these
needs to be considered. In some areas, like Portici, high-rise buildings
have been erected very close to one another and even ordinary fires
have a real potential to trigger new fires in adjacent buildings through
thermal radiation and flying embers.19 This same proximity of
buildings could, however, have very important sheltering effects in
protecting buildings against a PDC, especially on the sides of those
buildings facing away from the crater.
6.2. Vulnerability in tephra falls
Sudden and catastrophic roof collapse is one of the deadliest
impacts of large explosive eruptions, as in the AD79 and 1631 events at
Vesuvius, the two largest eruptions of the volcano in the last two
thousand years. The two severest eruptions in the last two hundred
years (1822 and 1906) were both violent Strombolian, and the fallout
containing lapilli from lava fountaining in 1906 destroyed roofs
and caused buildings to collapse throughout the town of Ottaviano,
as described above. Substantial advances have been made on the
vulnerability of buildings and their occupants in tephra falls by the
EXPLORIS group (Spence et al., 2005b). The mass loading of tephra
Fig. 7. Simulation of a future sub-Plinian 1 (reference) eruption and the hypothetical consequences to buildings and occupants. The damage is the cumulative result of a sequence of
hazard impacts: earthquake, tephra fallout and a single pyroclastic flow. The Red Zone area demarcated by the outermost comuni boundaries is also shown, and it is evident that
lethal impacts can potentially occur beyond the Red Zone, an important consideration for mitigation planning (Zuccaro et al., 2008-this issue).
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by multiplying the thickness of ash by the bulk density of the deposit.
A soaking of ash by heavy rain can slightly increase the bulk density by
compacting the mixture. Zuccaro et al. (2008-this issue) have shown
that reinforced concrete roofs in the circumvesuvian area are quite
resistant to collapse, needing at least 500 kg/m2 loading to affect
the weaker types. But the roofs of some houses with poorer quality
roofs, such as tiles on timber, will collapse at loads between 100 and
200 kg/m2.
Deaths and injuries are caused by direct trauma from being struck
by falling structural beams, tiles, etc., and also from entrapment and
asphyxiation caused by burial under the infilling ash. Simplified
estimates of fatalities and surviving casualties in roof collapses were
first based in part on building collapse data in earthquakes and from a
photographic survey of building damage in the Pinatubo eruption in
1991, andwere applied in an earlier study of volcanic risk for the single
story, vernacular housing at Furnas volcano, Azores (Pomonis et al.,
1999). Subsequently, the estimates were widened in EXPLORIS to
includemulti-storey buildings, but field survey data onwhich to refine
further these estimates remains insufficient.
Tephra fall deposits in the larger eruptions of Vesuvius typically
comprise highly vesicular pumice and have low bulk density
compared to the deposits of wet, dense, phreato-magmatic ash
which are common in the fallout sequences of many eruptions (Cioni
et al., 2003). It is misleading to think of tephra fall only in terms of
ash in a future sub-Plinian 1 eruption: in the 1631 event it contained
angular and subangular lapilli, bombs, lithics and scoria clasts, with
the largest lithics and clasts being capable of causing head injury and
smashing windows, as far as 8 km from the volcano. The main fallout
from the 1631 plume was along a narrow east axis with a 10 cmisopach at 30 km from the crater, but a much more extensive area of
settled ash occurred which in an eruption today would have serious
consequences for transport and lifelines. The extent of the fallout
depends upon the prevailing winds at different heights in the
troposphere. An even larger area, extending hundreds or thousands
of kilometres, could be affected by airborne ash, causing disruption to
human activity and transportation.
Buildings with weak roofs could be “hardened” to bring them up a
resistance of 5 kPa (500 kg/m2) by the use of temporary propping
using wooden or metal props placed beneath the purlins of tiled roofs.
An alternative strategy would be to tell people in vulnerable housing
to move to more robust buildings (which would need to be identified
in advance) at the start of an eruption.
6.3. Vulnerability in earthquakes
The effects of earthquakes on buildings can be reasonably well
estimated using macro-seismic intensity scales. There is some
uncertainty, however, about the seismic intensities and their
importance in volcanogenic earthquakes, as the literature on the
subject is sparse and the contemporary chronicles on the 1631
eruption make little reference to the effects on buildings of the
earthquakes during the escalation of activity towards eruption or
during the eruption itself. EXPLORIS developed the concept of
cumulative damage to buildings from the state of unrest onwards,
even though single earthquakes would not be of sufficient intensity
to do much damage (Zuccaro et al., 2008-this issue). However,
localised building collapses occurring during the state of unrest
could impede evacuation by blocking roads, and the modelling of
such seismic impacts was shown to provide valuable information to
Fig. 8. A and B. First simulation of a violent Strombolian eruption on the scale of 1944 event:withoutmitigationmeasures (A) andwithmitigationmeasures (B). See text for explanation
and Macedonio et al. (2008-this issue).
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Fig. 9.MESIMEX fallout map (isopachs kg/m2) used in evacuation planning during the state of unrest: forecasting the area of tephra fallout from a threatened sub-Plinian eruption to
direct the evacuation routes taken next day away from this area (Macedonio et al., 2006).
20 We do not regard a given numerical simulation model as a close depiction of a future
eruptive event, but the basis for understanding apotential range of behaviour,whichneeds
to be revised as knowledge and computer power grows. Models have both epistemic and
stochastic uncertainties. In the MESIMEX exercise an ensemble of four different fallout
models, namely HAZMAP, Macedonio et al. (2005), FALL3D (Costa et al., 2006), VOL-
CALPUFF (Barsotti et al., 2008) and TEPHRA (Bonadonna et al., 2005) — was used, a
technique also applied inweather forecasting (Macedonio et al., 2006). For a full treatment
of models as hypotheses, see Oreskes et al. (1994).
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simulated a week of escalating unrest that culminated in an
eruption.
6.4. Modelling the impact of a sequence of volcanic hazards
Any actual eruption sequence may subject an individual building
close enough to the volcano to a series of events potentially causing
damage: one or more earthquakes, continuous tephra fall and a series
of PDCs. The state of the building at any point in time during and after
the eruption, and the hypothetical effects on its inhabitants, depends
not only on the vulnerability of the building and its inhabitants to each
separate hazard, but also to the lasting effects of those which have
preceded it. A simplistic approach is to ignore these interactions and
treat vulnerability as if it is not affected by the preceding hazards. Of
course, buildings which have been destroyed cannot be destroyed (or
occupants killed) a second time, but a simple joint probability
approach that estimates survival after multiple events as the product
of the probabilities of survival of each separate event will avoid such
double counting. However, there is little doubt that, for example, a
succession of moderate earthquakes will reduce the resistance of
many buildings to a PDC.
Thus Zuccaro et al. (2008-this issue) have developed for Vesuvius
a dynamic cumulative damage model for the resistance of buildings
impacted by the sequential forces of the three phenomena com-
bined; this appears to us to lead to the most realistic conservative
scenario in a future sub-Plinian 1 eruption. Up to a certain limit of
tephra deposit on a roof, the resistance of many buildings to lateral
pressure from the PDC is increased, whilst the seismic resistance is
lowered. Most vulnerable to the effect of ash loading and a strong
earthquake are the top storeys of reinforced concrete buildings withlarge roofs, but tall reinforced concrete and masonry buildings with
rigid floors are more resistant to the combination of the three
hazards.
7. Modelling impacts and risk assessment: the scope for
mitigation measures
At the start of EXPLORIS, Vesuvius was unique amongst the
four main study volcanoes in having a national emergency plan. The
plan, first issued in 1995 and undergoing revision as EXPLORIS
was ending, is hazard based. The Red Zone area around Vesuvius
is based on the run-out limits of PDCs (based on the 1631 PDCs
extension and later modified to take into account the Comuni
boundaries); the Yellow Zone for tephra fallout; and the Blue Zone
where flooding and lahar formation might be expected. Evacuation
from the Red Zone, the most dangerous area, would safeguard
the lives of 500,000 people. Numerical simulation modelling,
as advanced in EXPLORIS, should help to further delineate these
zones for the different scenarios and those for violent Strombolian
eruptions in the future.20
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scenarios and their impacts in the built-up Vesuvian area will be
briefly outlined here as examples of the EXPLORIS tools and as a
demonstration of the implications of the vulnerability of buildings and
their occupants in influencing the estimated numbers of hypothetical
casualties for risk assessment and mitigation purposes. The interested
reader is referred to Zuccaro et al. (2008-this issue), for a full descrip-
tion of the methods and outputs. It is important to appreciate that
the deaths and injuries are first computed for risk analysis on a
hypothetical population which remains in place during the course of
an eruption and does not evacuate or adopt any risk reduction
measures: we emphasise that this is not what is likely or intended to
happen and the numbers are not the expected casualties except in a
statistical risk sense. Work on the modelling and mitigation of the
consequences of an eruption can proceed even if we do not know how
likely it is the event will occur. But constraining the likelihood of each
type of eruption can help to prioritise the mitigation measures for
emergency planners, and statistically combining probabilities from
the event tree with casualty outputs from the models will eventually
permit the drawing of risk maps for Vesuvius based on individual and
societal risk, as was done for Montserrat (Fig. 3).
7.1. Scenario 1: eruption on the scale of 1631 reference event (Fig. 7)
A scenario chosen for a 1631 reference eruption is one of vol-
canogenic earthquakes affecting the area during the state of unrest,
followed by tephra fallout to the west of the volcano and then a single
PDC towards the coast in the main phase (Zuccaro et al., 2008-this
issue). The cumulative impact of the seismic energy leads to some
building collapses andweakening of the roofs of other buildings in the
fallout area, as estimated using a macro-seismic intensity scale. The
EXPLORIS three-dimensional PDC model has been used for estimating
the direction of the flow and its dynamic pressure and temperature in
the built-up area. The tephra load on roofs across the fallout area is
derived from the FALL-3D model output (Macedonio et al., 2008-this
issue). The consequences of these phenomena in the impacted areas
are shown, with the impacted buildings in various states of damage
severity in Fig. 7.
The estimatednumberof deadwas4412 in theRedZonewithout any
measures to protect the buildings against the incursion of the PDC orFig. 10. Schematic outline of the casualty time-step model (Spence et al., this issue). The outl
for their contribution tomortality in people injured in a pyroclastic flow; it is a test of search a
text).collapse of roofs under the weight of tephra (a board to cover the
window and a temporary roof support, respectively), compared to 1843
hypothetical deaths if suchmeasureswere inplace (a reduction of about
60% hypothetical deaths in total). The feasibility of using suchmeasures
to protect houses and other buildings needs further evaluation, but the
scope for reducing the impacts is clearly substantial.
7.2. Scenario 2: eruption on scale of the 1944 event (Fig. 8A and B)
A scenario for a violent Strombolian eruption according to the 1944
event wasmodelled using the FALL3D code (Macedonio et al., 2008-this
issue) and was based on a 1944-size eruption, using grain-sized data
from the 1906 eruption and the available meteorological (wind) data.
Themapof thedamagedbuildings is shown (Fig. 8A) for a tephra loading
of N100 kg/m2 and an estimated 2990 deaths was calculated using the
vulnerabilitymodelling. This is amuchhigherdeath toll than in1944 (21
deaths) which can be attributed to the much increased density of
population around Vesuvius since then, but these numbers can be
reduced to 1892 (Fig. 8B) by a temporary strengthening of the weaker
roofs, e.g., by theuseof portable props. The samerisk reductionwouldbe
achieved by simply advising the people in themost vulnerable houses to
move to designated buildings with stronger roofs when the eruption
starts. These measures clearly provide a major and worthwhile re-
duction of the potential impact.
7.3. Scenario 3: evacuation called and real time, worst-case modelling
(based on 1631 reference eruption) used to forecast sector of main tephra
fallout (Fig. 9)
The MESIMEX exercise in October 2006 followed soon after the
final meeting of the EXPLORIS project in Naples in May of that year. It
was gratifying for the EXPLORIS team to see the modelling tools
developed in EXPLORIS being applied, with the outputs of four
different fallout models being combined and run in real time using
the prevailing meteorological data20 to guide the Civil Protection in
their evacuation exercise of the Red and Yellow Zones (Macedonio
et al., 2006). The forecast for the plume-track was for the next day,
when the eruption appeared likely, and it showed the importance of
evacuating in a direction away from the east-south-east sector where
the heaviest fallout was expected (Fig. 9).ine shows the main factors incorporated in the model and are capable of being analysed
nd rescue capability, pre-hospital casualty management and hospital inpatient care (see
22 The production of hazard maps at volcanoes is a growth industry amongst
scientists. Although volcanologists are very aware of the vital importance of their
work, the response of authorities, even in technologically advanced countries, is still
quite variable. The global picture is far from encouraging. We regard hazard mapping
as a key step in the development of risk maps, which then can serve to show the
consequences of inaction in greater relief. The subject is too young to yet know if risk
modelling will have a greater impact on land-use planning decisions.
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emergency planning and mitigation the outputs in terms of damaged
and destroyed houses, and hypothetical deaths (or injuries), must
eventually be presented in ranges and probabilities. A single number of
deaths, for example, for a given scenario is an inadequate guide to the
impacts of an expected eruption, where there is uncertainly over its
magnitude, power and duration, and a whole range of hypothetical
casualties thatmight arise. Aswell as ranges and distributions for inputs
tomodels, stochastic uncertainty can be incorporated by techniques like
the widely used Monte Carlo simulation to provide outputs, such as the
estimated numbers of deaths or injuries, in the form of probability
distributions (Woo, 1999). The full range of impacts of the expected
scenarios and their probabilities is a requirement of a risk-based
approach which prevents a false expectation of large numbers and
doomsday scenarios, when what might actually happen is on a much
smaller scale, for example, and is readily capable of being planned for.
8. Other mitigation measures
8.1. Search and rescue planning
Hazard-based planning for an eruption will be reliant on early
evacuation, in theory, as a precautionary measure, and an assumption
of this approach is that the populationwill bewilling and able to move
when directed. This work has already shown that such an approach is
not without its own risks and uncertainties, and is not a panacea to the
problems of decision making, as we have described above. There are
unfortunately well-founded reasons for planning for a disaster in
which people are in place when an eruption begins. For example, the
activity might escalate so fast that there is not enough time to
evacuate everybody in an organised and timely fashion; people may
resist evacuation, as in Tungurahua, Ecuador; or people will return to
their homes in danger zones despite official warnings during
protracted periods of evacuation (e.g., Montserrat; Loughlin et al.,
2002). How relevant these examples are to Vesuvius is not known.
Search and rescue plans would need to be considered for large
numbers of burns casualties, and for people trapped under roof
collapses, as described above. Such planning would be entirely novel
to the emergency services, but the knowledge is now available to
support the development of such plans.
A casualty search and rescue simulation model was devised in
EXPLORIS and used to study themaindetermining factors that governed
the survival of burns victims in a mass rescue after a hypothetical
eruption of Soufrière, Guadeloupe21 (Spence et al., 2008-this issue). The
casualty model could also be applied to Vesuvius. Fawcett and Oliveira
(2000) originally described the principles of the model for an earth-
quake scenario, but the method is readily applicable to emergency
planning at volcanoes. The main inputs are summarised in Fig. 10 and
include the numbers of casualties, survival times with and without
treatment, the accessibility and capacity to triage and treat at the
availablemedical centres, and themode and availability of land, sea and
air rescue. The model can be run on most personal computers and is a
time stepping (updated every 2 h), zone-based programme on the
movement and treatment of casualties, with casualties and treatment
facilities located in each zone connected to other zones by defined travel
times. These inputs can be varied in the model to study the main21 The treatment and management of burns injuries is a specialised area of medicine
and is beyond the scope of this paper. Evidence on survival times of burns victims in
pyroclastic flows is sparse. Limited information is available from eruptions at Unzen
(1991) and Merapi (1994). Severe, full thickness burns affecting over 40% total body
surface area (TBSA) should be regarded as not survivable in a mass casualty event,
especially as the victim is likely to have suffered airway burns and severe lung injury
from the inhalation of hot ash as well. Treatment is most likely to be life-saving in
victims with TBSA 20–40%. The health sector would need to plan at a national level for
a future eruption of Vesuvius, as even a modest number of survivors with burns would
be beyond the capacity of local hospitals to treat in their intensive care facilities.influences that govern survival, such as the availability and emergency
capacity of standing and field hospitals, access to tertiary referral
centres, numbers of rescue teams and transport, e.g., helicopters, and the
optimum time for rescue to begin.22
8.2. Land use planning
We have explored in this paper the use of an evidence-based
approach towards advancing mitigation at Vesuvius and provided
preliminary examples of its application to forecasts and warnings,
disaster preparedness, engineering measures for reducing building
vulnerability and real-time eruption modelling to guide decision
making as the crisis unfolds. One of the main innovations in EXPLORIS
is the use of probabilistic reasoning in crisis management to measure
and analyse information for decisionmaking. On a different time-scale
than an emergency is land-use planning and the fundamental
vulnerability presented by over-development around Vesuvius in
the areas of greatest volcanic hazard. Orsi et al. (2003) have
summarised this problem, that historically mankind's plans have not
taken into consideration that the catastrophic events at Vesuvius have
a longer recurrence time than a human life. Every day pressures on
development and economic activity tend to push such hazards out of
sight when the commonperception is that there is a low probability of
a reawakening of the “sleeping giant” in an individual's lifetime
(Barberi et al., 2008). This is a general problem at all explosive
volcanoes, even when reliable hazard maps showing the extent of the
areas at potential risk are available.22 In this realm and with its
intractable uncertainty, it is the burden of prudence and not the
burden of evidence (proof) that should guide authorities (a form of the
precautionary principle), instead of the use of probabilities.23
9. Conclusions
Vesuvius has a unique status amongst the earth's volcanoes as its
frequent explosive and effusive activity over the centuries has
attracted more scientific interest and studies than any other. The
present state of repose since 1944 has allowed a massive growth of
population around its flanks, which now presents scientists and
decision makers with a major challenge, as the size or timing of the
next eruption cannot be forecast from the precursors once a new state
of unrest begins.
An evidence-based and multi-disciplinary approach to decision
making in a future crisis has been described as the basis for the
development of mitigation strategies. It adopts formal probabilistic
reasoning and statistical decision analysis in an analytic approach
which enumerates and quantifies all the processes and effects of the
eruptive hazards of the volcano that determine risk, whilst influenced
by statistical models of reasoning under uncertainty.23 An example of a cross-generation hazard of this type is the worst natural disaster
risk faced by the United Kingdom — a major North Sea surge and coastal flood along
the east coast of England, which occurs around once every hundred years or more. The
last one in 1953 was the worst natural disaster to strike Britain in the last century and
left 300 dead (over 1500 died as the surge swept across the English Channel into
Holland). In 1968, the eminent physicist and cosmologist, Sir Hermann Bondi (1919–
2005) was asked to advise the government on the construction of a great barrier across
the River Thames to protect London against future flood risk, which he convincingly
justified on the basis of the precautionary principle rather than on any risk-benefit
analysis based on probabilities. His justification hinged on the grounds of the enormity
of the potential disaster and the availability of reasonable measures to prevent it
(Baxter, 2005). The Thames Barrier was opened in 1982.
472 P.J. Baxter et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 178 (2008) 454–473EXPLORIS has incorporated several key advances that are unique
to Vesuvius for resolving the spatio-temporal impacts of a future
explosive eruption and which can be integrated in risk assessment,
mitigation and emergency planning. These are the detailed studies on
its past eruptions and their products, an event tree and its emergency
scenarios, advanced deterministic and probabilistic numerical mod-
elling of PDCs and tephra fallout, a comprehensive vulnerability
database on the built environment in the circumvesuvian area, and
themapping of modelled impacts on the buildings and infrastructure,
with their consequent hypothetical casualties. The model outputs can
be also provided in real time to assist decision making in an actual
crisis.
This pioneering work has shown the feasibility and uses of
developing a risk-based mitigation strategy at Vesuvius and the need
for multi-disciplinary methods that incorporate model and stochastic
uncertainty. Operating guidelines and rigorous substantiation tools
need to be an integral part of its future application at Vesuvius. A large
amount of work will be needed to refine these models and their
probabilistic inputs and outputs, including risk maps, but it is evident
from the examples of our research how the tools can be used for
mitigation and emergency planning purposes. The advances over
hazard maps, or previous risk maps, include the incorporation of the
totality of knowledge of Vesuvius and its inhabitants, and the most
recent information on the inner state of the volcano.
To be able to incorporate all of these spatio-temporal factors into a
probabilistic framework, which incorporates scientific uncertainty in a
way that can inform decision making, represents a major advance on
present methods of volcanic disaster management and provides a
logically consistent foundation for the development of emergency
planning and mitigation at Vesuvius.
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